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Abstract 
JPMorgan Chase (JPM) prided itself on having the best risk-management practices in 
the financial industry, having survived the 2007-09 financial crisis in better shape 
than many competitors. Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon often spoke of the bank’s 
“fortress balance sheet.” A keen focus on risk management is vital to JPM’s longevity, 
as is the case with all highly leveraged financial institutions. However, the JPM Task 
Force that investigated the $6 billion 2012 London Whale trading loss concluded that 
risk-management practices at the bank’s Chief Investment Office (CIO), the unit in 
which the loss occurred, were given less scrutiny by senior management than those 
of the bank’s client-facing businesses, despite the fact that the Chief Investment Office 
managed $350 billion in assets, an amount almost double JPM’s total stockholders’ 
equity at December 31, 2011.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1  This case is one of nine produced by the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) examining issues 
related to the JPMorgan Chase London Whale. The following are the other case studies in this case 
series. 
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale A: Risky Business 
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale B: Derivatives Valuation 
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale C: Risk Limits, Metrics, and Models 
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale E: Supervisory Oversight 
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale F: Required Securities Disclosures 
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale G: Hedging Versus Proprietary Trading 
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale H: Cross-Border Regulation 
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale Z: Background and Overview 
Cases are available at the Journal of Financial Crises. 
2  Project Editor, Case Study and Research, YPFS, Yale School of Management. The authors 
acknowledge comments from Jihad Dagher. 






Jamie Dimon has been the public face of JPMorgan Chase & Company (JPM) since becoming 
the bank’s Chief Executive Officer in December 2005 and Chairman of the Board in December 
2006. Mr. Dimon often spoke of the bank’s “fortress balance sheet,” and JPM prided itself on 
having the best risk-management practices in the financial industry, surviving the 2007-09 
financial crisis in better shape than many competitors. In fact, JPM acquired Bear Stearns 
investment firm and Washington Mutual bank during the height of the crisis in 2008 with 
strong encouragement and support from the United States (US) government. 
Partially as the result of these acquisitions, JPM grew to become the largest US bank holding 
company, with almost $2.3 trillion in total assets at December 31, 2011. The holding 
company was managed on a line-of-business basis, with six major reportable business 
segments, listed below, and a “Corporate/Private Equity” segment. This latter segment 
included the firm’s internal Corporate Treasury department, a private equity group, the Chief 
Investment Office (CIO), corporate staff units, and other centrally managed expenses. 
• Wholesale Businesses 
▪ Investment Bank 
▪ Commercial Banking 
▪ Treasury and Security Services 
▪ Asset Management 
• Consumer Businesses 
▪ Retail Financial Services 
▪ Card Services and Auto 
Many of the risk management practices employed in the client-facing parts of JPM did not 
extend to the CIO, which was a consistently profitable internal unit that invested the bank’s 
excess deposits (over loan balances) and also hedged risks associated with borrower default, 
interest rates, and mortgage servicing rights on behalf of other units within the bank. As a 
result of deficiencies in CIO’s risk management, Bruno Iksil and a small team of derivatives 
traders in CIO’s London office were able to undertake an ill-timed and ill-fated trading 
strategy in the first quarter of 2012 that ultimately cost the bank over $6 billion and the 
traders their jobs, while also tarnishing the reputation of both Dimon and JPM. 
The JPMorgan Chase Management Task Force that conducted an internal investigation of the 
2012 CIO losses concluded that risk management practices at CIO were given less scrutiny 
by senior bank management than those of client-facing businesses, despite the fact that CIO 
managed about $350 billion in assets, an amount almost double JPM’s total stockholders’ 
equity at December 31, 2011. 
As an example of lax risk management, CIO operated without a Chief Risk Officer from its 
inception as a stand-alone unit in 2005 until January 2012, despite the key role that the 
business unit Chief Risk Officer was supposed to play in the JPM risk-management process. 
In addition, the CIO Risk Committee met only three times in all of 2011, and the committee’s 
first meeting in 2012 was on March 28, almost a week after the head of CIO had ordered Iksil 
and his team to stop trading the credit derivatives that caused the losses. 
The remainder of the case is organized as follows. Section 2 explains JPM’s risk-management 
framework and governance structure, including responsibilities at the Board of Directors, 
senior management, and line-of-business levels. Section 3 describes specific flaws in the CIO 
risk function and possible reasons for those shortcomings. Section 4 concludes with a 
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discussion of remedial measures undertaken by JPM to improve risk management across all 
units of the bank including CIO. See Appendix 1 for a timeline of key events pertinent to this 
case module. 
Questions 
1. Why were CIO’s risk management practices given less scrutiny by senior bank 
management? 
2. What deficiencies resulted from this lack of attention? 
3. Will the actions taken by JPM following the bank’s self-assessment of its risk 
function in the aftermath of the London Whale trades prove effective in mitigating 
similar incidents in the future? 
2. Risk Management at JPM 
Cognizant of the risks facing it as a highly leveraged financial institution, JPM devoted 43 
pages of its 2011 Form 10-K annual report to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
describing the firm’s risk management practices, beginning by noting “[r]isk is an inherent 
part of JPMorgan Chase’s business activities.” JPM identified the following nine major risks 




4. Interest Rate 
5. Country 
6. Private Equity 
7. Operational 
8. Legal and Fiduciary 
9. Reputation 
JPM’s risk management framework and governance structure consisted of both quantitative 
and qualitative elements. Bruno Iksil and his fellow team of traders within JPM’s CIO 
responsible for the London Whale losses generally ignored the quantitative risk limits, 
metrics, and models that were in place to measure and monitor the amount of market risk 
they took. In addition, the traders mismarked the fair value of certain of their derivative 
positions in an attempt to hide their losses from management, thereby also hiding how much 
risk they took. (These topics and deficiencies in certain other aspects of CIO risk 
management are covered in Zeissler, et al. 2019B and Zeissler, et al. 2014C.)  
On April 4, 2012, just two days before Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal released the 
first reports about the London Whale trades, JPM issued a proxy statement and notice of its 
2012 annual shareholders meeting. The proxy statement summarized JPM’s corporate 
governance structure, including the five principal committees of the Board of Directors. (See 
Figure 1.) 
The Risk Policy Committee “provides oversight of the CEO’s and senior management’s 
responsibilities to assess and manage the Firm’s credit risk, market risk, interest-rate risk, 
investment risk, liquidity risk, and reputational risk, and is also responsible for review of the 
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Firm’s fiduciary and asset management activities.” In 2011, the committee was chaired by 
James Crown (president of Henry Crown and Company, a privately-owned investment 
company), with David Cote (chairman and chief executive officer of Honeywell International) 
and Ellen Futter (president of the American Museum of Natural History) serving as 
committee members (JPM Proxy 2012, 3-5, 8-9). 
JPM used a formal framework to link the firm’s appetite for risk with its return targets, 
capital management, and other controls. The Risk Policy Committee approved the risk 
appetite policy on behalf of the Board. Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon established JPM’s 
overall risk appetite and also approved the risk appetite that the head of each of the bank’s 
lines of business had set for their unit (JPM Proxy 2012, 11). 
 
Figure 1: JPM Corporate Governance Structure 
 
Source: JPM Proxy 2012, 8. 
 
The stated aim of JPM’s risk-management framework was “to create a culture of risk 
awareness and personal responsibility throughout the Firm where collaboration, discussion, 
escalation and sharing of information is encouraged.” Consistent with encouraging personal 
responsibility, JPM’s risk-governance structure was “based on the principle that each line of 
business is responsible for managing the risk inherent in its business, albeit with appropriate 
Corporate oversight” (JPM 10-K 2011, 125). The following corporate functions provided 
oversight. 
1. Risk Management: “coordinates and communicates with each line of business 
through the line of business risk committees and chief risk officers to manage risk” 
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2. Chief Investment Office (CIO): “responsible for measuring, monitoring, reporting and 
managing the Firm’s liquidity, interest rate and foreign exchange risk, and other 
structural risks” 
3. Corporate Treasury: same responsibilities as the CIO 
4. Legal and Compliance: “oversight for legal risk” 
JPM assigned primary responsibility for the nine risks to the four functions as shown in 
Figure 2. 
The Risk Management function was headed by the bank’s Chief Risk Officer (Barry Zubrow 
to January 2012, and John Hogan thereafter). The Chief Risk Officer reported to Dimon, was 
a member of the senior management Operating Committee, and had accountability to the 
Board and its Risk Policy Committee. 
 
Figure 2: Nine Major Risk Types and Four Corporate Functions with Risk-Management 
Responsibilities 








Liquidity Risk     
Credit Risk     
Market Risk     
Interest Rate Risk     
Country Risk     
Private Equity Risk     
Operational Risk     
Legal Risk     
Reputation Risk**     
 
*  These units are also responsible for foreign exchange risk and “other structural risks.” 
** Reputation risk was not directly assigned to one of the four functions, since “maintenance 
of the Firm’s reputation is the responsibility of each individual employee at the Firm.” 
Source: JPM 10-K 2011, 125, 167. 
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3. Risk Management in CIO 
Though sharing some similar responsibilities, as noted above, the CIO unit was spun off from 
the Corporate Treasury department in 2005 as a separate group within JPM. Ina Drew, who 
served as JPM’s Chief Investment Officer, was appointed to lead the CIO. 
CIO played an important role at JPM, being primarily responsible for managing $350 billion 
of the bank’s excess deposits, an amount roughly double JPM’s total stockholders’ equity of 
$184 billion at December 31, 2011 (JPM 10-K 2011, 179). One of CIO’s secondary roles was 
to use derivatives such as credit default swaps to partially offset the risk that someone who 
borrowed from JPM might not repay their debt. This risk was to be hedged by CIO’s Synthetic 
Credit Portfolio (SCP), which was run out of London by senior trader Bruno Iksil, junior 
trader Julien Grout, and their superior Javier Martin-Artajo. The SCP was the source of JPM’s 
$6.2 billion “London Whale” loss. 
The JPMorgan Chase Management Task Force (JPM Task Force) was formed in May 2012 to 
investigate the reasons for the CIO losses and to suggest remedies. In its report issued in 
January 2013, the JPM Task Force concluded that risk-management practices at CIO were 
given less scrutiny by senior bank management for a number of reasons (JPM Task Force 
2013, 94-96). 
First, CIO did not need to meet government regulations applicable to client-facing businesses 
within JPM, such as the Truth in Lending Act that protected consumer borrowers. CIO was 
part of JPM’s Corporate/Private Equity group, not part of one of the bank’s six reportable 
business segments (JPM 10-K 2011, 79). 
Second, CIO was consistently profitable before 2012, and the SCP added over $1.8 billion to 
the bank’s pre-tax income from 2008 through 2011. 
Third, CIO’s primary portfolio was invested in Treasury bonds and other investment-grade 
(high-quality, low-risk) fixed-income securities, which is a conservative investment 
approach that was consistent with how other banks managed their excess deposits. 
Fourth, although the net notional size (i.e., the net underlying par value on which credit 
protection was bought or sold) of SCP increased from $4 billion to $51 billion during 2011, 
this was still relatively small in comparison to CIO’s $350 billion bond portfolio resulting 
from the excess deposits. 
Fifth, the dramatic increase in the size of the SCP book in 2011 and the first quarter of 2012 
was obscured by the implementation of a new Value at Risk model in January 2012 that 
appeared to show that CIO market risk had remained roughly constant. 
The JPM Task Force concluded that insufficient scrutiny of CIO by top bank management 
resulted in the following negative outcomes: 
CIO Risk Management lacked the personnel and structure necessary to manage the 
risks of the Synthetic Credit Portfolio. With respect to personnel, a new CIO Chief Risk 
Officer was appointed in early 2012, and he was learning the role at the precise time 
the traders were building the ultimately problematic positions. More broadly, the CIO 
Risk function had been historically understaffed, and some of the CIO risk personnel 
lacked the requisite skills. With respect to structural issues, the CIO Risk Committee 
met only infrequently, and its regular attendees did not include personnel from 
outside CIO. As a result, the CIO Risk Committee did not effectively perform its 
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intended role as a forum for constructive challenge of practices, strategies and 
controls. Furthermore, at least some CIO risk managers did not consider themselves 
sufficiently independent from CIO’s business operations and did not feel empowered 
to ask hard questions, criticize trading strategies or escalate their concerns in an 
effective manner to Firm-wide Risk Management. And finally, the Task Force has 
concluded that CIO management, along with Firm-wide Risk Management, did not 
fulfill their responsibilities to ensure that CIO control functions were effective or that 
the environment in CIO was conducive to their effectiveness. (JPM Task Force 2013, 
12-15) 
Despite the vital role that the line-of-business Chief Risk Officer was supposed to play in the 
risk-management process, CIO did not have a true Chief Risk Officer from its inception as a 
stand-alone unit in 2005 until January 2012. Peter Weiland served as CIO’s senior-most risk 
officer (in his capacity as head of Market Risk) from 2008 to January 2012, but he initially 
reported directly to Ina Drew, who was JPM’s Chief Investment Officer and the head of CIO. 
This resulted in a lack of independence between trading and risk-management functions. 
After criticism from regulators in 2009, Weiland began reporting directly to Zubrow, the JPM 
Chief Risk Officer at the time, while continuing to report indirectly to Drew. However, 
Weiland testified to the US Senate that this change in reporting relationships made no 
meaningful difference in practice and that his job was descriptive (to make sure that risk 
metrics were properly calculated and disseminated), rather than prescriptive (to enforce 
limits and challenge trading decisions if needed). 
In January 2012, just as Iksil proposed to aggressively ramp up the size of the SCP’s 
derivatives positions, JPM made several changes to risk personnel. At the firm-wide level, 
Zubrow moved from Chief Risk Officer to become head of Corporate and Regulatory Affairs 
(before announcing his retirement in October 2012). John Hogan, previously the Chief Risk 
Officer of JPM’s Investment Bank, took over for Zubrow. 
One of Hogan’s first acts was to appoint Irvin Goldman to be CIO’s first official Chief Risk 
Officer, based on the recommendation of Drew and Zubrow. Though Goldman previously 
worked for Drew as a portfolio manager and then as head of CIO Strategy, he had never 
served in any risk-management capacity at JPM prior to this promotion.  
Furthermore, the CIO Risk Committee was not in a position to act as an effective check on 
risk taking by the traders. Unlike risk committee meetings in other JPM business lines, CIO 
Risk Committee meetings usually included only CIO personnel. Making matters worse, the 
CIO Risk Committee met only three times in all of 2011, and the committee met for the first 
time in 2012 on March 28, after Drew had ordered her employees to stop trading the SCP 
book on March 23. The JPM Task Force noted that “[h]ad there been senior traders or risk 
managers from outside CIO or had the CIO Risk Committee met more often, the process might 
have been used to more pointedly vet the traders’ strategies in the first quarter of 2012” 
(JPM Task Force 2013, 100). 
4. Aftermath 
In its report, the JPM Task Force held Zubrow, in his capacity as JPM Chief Risk Officer until 
January 2012, at fault for certain failures of the CIO Risk function. “The CIO Risk organization 
was not equipped to properly risk-manage the portfolio during the first quarter of 2012, and 
it performed ineffectively…during that period” due to shortcomings in structure and 
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personnel, coupled with inadequate limits and controls on the SCP (JPM Task Force 2013, 8). 
Zubrow announced his retirement from JPM in October 2012, effective February 2013. 
The JPM Task Force also held Douglas Braunstein, the JPM Chief Financial Officer, 
responsible for weaknesses in financial controls over the SCP and for the failure of the CIO 
Finance function to properly monitor the evolution of the SCP book during the first quarter 
of 2012. Braunstein stepped down as Chief Financial Officer at the end of 2012. (Goldman 
resigned in July 2012, and Weiland resigned in October.) 
Hogan, the JPM Chief Risk Officer since January 2012, led a self-assessment of the risk 
function in CIO and each of the other lines of business, focusing on three major areas. 
First, with respect to model governance and implementation, JPM initiated plans to identify 
the significant valuation and risk models across its business units, to store all models in a 
central database, to minimize how different models treat the same products, and to review 
old or rarely used models (JPM Task Force 2013, 113). 
Second, with respect to market risk and governance, Chetan Bhargiri was promoted from 
Managing Director of Market Risk at JPM’s Investment Bank to Chief Risk Officer of CIO, 
Treasury, and Corporate. Mr. Bhargiri had already hired 20 risk-management officers by 
January 2013. JPM reviewed and revised market-risk limits across all lines of business, 
adding more granular limits, including numerous portfolio-specific limits at CIO for the first 
time (JPM Task Force 2013, 114). 
Third, with respect to risk independence, JPM created a firm-wide risk committee. The 
existing CIO risk committee with its many shortcomings was discontinued. It was replaced 
by the CIO, Treasury, and Corporate Risk Committee, which began to hold weekly meetings 
chaired by Bhargiri and by Matthew Zames, the JPM co-Chief Operating Officer. In addition 
to taking place much more often, the risk committee meetings now included senior managers 
from inside and outside CIO, including Mr. Hogan (JPM Task Force 2013, 116). 
In September and October 2013, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Federal 
Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority announced 
settlement agreements with JPM, penalizing the firm a total of $1.020 billion and requiring 
it to admit wrongdoing in certain instances. (OCC Press Release 2013-140, USCFTC 2013) 
While the various regulatory agencies focused on different aspects of the 2012 CIO losses in 
their respective settlements with JPM, the OCC levied a $300 million fine (the largest single 
piece of the penalty) against JPM for unsafe and unsound banking practices that were caused 
by “inadequate oversight and governance to protect the bank from material risk, inadequate 
risk management processes and procedures, inadequate control over pricing of trades, 
inadequate development and implementation of models used by the bank, and inadequate 
internal audit processes” (OCC Press Release 2013 and report 2013-140). (Omissions in 
JPM’s disclosures to the OCC, as well as failures by the OCC to properly supervise the bank’s 
risks, are explored in Zeissler, et al. 2014E.) 
The Federal Reserve Board penalized JPM $200 million for failing “to appropriately inform 
its board of directors and the Federal Reserve of deficiencies in risk-management systems 
identified by management” (FRB Press Release 20130919). 
In an internal memo dated March 31, 2014, JPM said that it would recombine the CIO and 
Treasury units, which is how asset-liability management function is traditionally structured 
at most banks (Braithwaite and Massoudi 2014). 
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Appendix 1: Timeline of Key Events 
2012 January 
John Hogan replaced Barry Zubrow as JPM Chief Risk Officer. 
Hogan appointed Irvin Goldman to be the first official Chief 
Risk Officer of the Chief Investment Office (CIO). 
 March 23 
Ina Drew (JPM Chief Investment Officer and head of CIO) 
ordered the CIO traders to stop trading the Synthetic Credit 
Portfolio (SCP). 
 March 28 CIO Risk Committee held its first meeting of 2012. 
 April 6 Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal published the first news stories about the “London Whale.” 
 May 
The JPMorgan Chase Management Task Force (JPM Task 
Force) was formed to investigate the reasons for the CIO 
losses and to suggest remedies. 
 July Goldman resigned. 
 October 
Zubrow announced that he would resign from JPM, effective 
February 2013. Peter Weiland, CIO Head of Market Risk, 
resigned. 
 December 31 
Year-to-date SCP losses = $6.2 billion. Douglas Braunstein 
stepped down as JPM Chief Financial Officer. 
2013 January The JPM Task Force issued its report. 
 September-October 
Four regulators in the US and one in the UK reached 
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